Towards a Thomistic Theory of Intentional (“Fictive”) Individuals (I)
Following Aristotle’s stimuli, the medieval scholastics produced the the- ory of beings of reason (= intentional beings), i.e. beings that can only exist as an object of our reason (and in no other way). It is remarkable that an important component was omitted by the scholastic scholars, namely the...
Đã lưu trong:
| Tác giả chính: | |
|---|---|
| Định dạng: | Sách |
| Năm xuất bản: |
2018
|
| Chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập Trực tuyến: | http://lrc.quangbinhuni.edu.vn:8181/dspace/handle/DHQB_123456789/3882 |
| Tags: |
Thêm thẻ
Không có thẻ, Hãy là người đầu tiên gắn thẻ bản ghi này!
|
| Tóm tắt: | Following Aristotle’s stimuli, the medieval scholastics produced the the- ory of beings of reason (= intentional beings), i.e. beings that can only exist as an object of our reason (and in no other way). It is remarkable that an important component was omitted by the scholastic scholars, namely the teaching of intentional (nowadays called “fictional” more frequently) individuals, e.g. Sherlock Holmes, Hamlet, Hephaistos etc. This issue was dealt with later by A. Meinong, E. Mally, T. Parsons and E. N. Zalta. This contribution strives to propose an alternative theory founded on the scholastic, specifically Thomistic thought. The author distinguish- es 1) |
|---|